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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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) 
) 
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) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT No. 16971 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS UPON PETITION FOR .REHEARING 
NATURE OF CASE 
Centurian Corporation ("Centurian") brought an action against 
A. L. Cripps and Walter A. Cripps ("Cripps"), claiming a delinquent 
amount due under a lease agreement to repossess a tank trailer, the 
subject matter of the lease. Subsequently, Petty Motor Lease, Inc. 
("Petty"), claiming to be the owner of the vehicle leased by 
Centurian to Cripps moved to intervene in the action. The motion to 
intervene was granted. However, the case was filed in a separate 
number and file. Trial was held July 13, 1976. The trial court, 
in a memorandum decision and in the judgment, held that it was with-
out jurisdiction of the complaint of Petty against the defendants in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intervention, Centurian Corporation, Richard Nickles and Margaret 
K. Nickles. 
Petty appealed and Centurian and Nickles cross-appealed. 
This court remanded the matter back to the trial court and the 
trial court gave relief to Petty as against Centurian and Nickles 
but denied relief to Centurian and Nickles as against Cripps. Both 
Petty and Centurian/Nickles sought additional relief of the trial 
court by way of motions to amend, but both motions were denied. 
Centurian and Nickles timely perfected this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants Centurian and Nickles seek a reversal of the 
trial court and a judgment in their favor against Petty; or in 
the alternative a reduction in the judgment in favor of Petty 
together with relief against Cripps in whatever amount Petty obtains 
against Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February 1973, Centurian and Nickles leased a new 1973 
trans-liner semi tank trailer from Petty. The lease is dated 
February 1, 1973 and is guaranteed by Richard H. Nickles and 
Margaret K. Nickles individually. (Exhibit 7-I) At the same time 
an additional document was executed wherein Centurian, at the end 
of the lease agreed to purchase, after all payments under the lease 
have been paid, for the sum of $621.00. This document is guaranteec 
by Richard H. Nickles only and not by Margaret K. Nickles. (Exhibit 
-2-
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Centurian used the trailer for a few loads and then leased 
the same to Cripps. Cripps was to hold Centurian and Nickles 
harmless under the terms of the lease and or purchase agreement. 
(Exhibit P-1) It was admitted by Cripps at trial that they were 
in default of the payments as required by Exhibit P-1 and the trial 
court granted judgment for all past due payments on the trailer to 
Centurian. 
In February or March 1974, the tank trailer was stolen by 
a person or persons unknown. This theft was duly reported to the 
Carbon County Sheriff. (Record, 269; Exhibit 4-P) At the time 
of said theft, Centurian/Nickles was current on the obligation to 
Petty. (Exhibit 9-I) 
Exhibit 7-I, which was drafted by Petty, specifically 
required Centurian/Nickles to provide insurance for public liability. 
The provisions relating to insurance coverage for fire, theft, 
comprehensive and collision have been left blank, but does recite 
that Petty may have in effect insurance coverage for fire, theft, 
comprehensive and collision and that if Centurian/Nickles furnishes 
a policy for this coverage, then Petty would cancel their own 
coverage. 
The lease further provides for termination automatically if 
any rental payment is not paid within ten (10) days of the due date. 
There was a payment due on March 15, 1974 for March. No payment was 
made by either Centurian/Nickles and/or Cripps. There was a deposit 
of $3,594.63 made on February 1, 1973 to insure faithful performance 
of the lease and return of the property. If there is a violation 
of the lease agreement, Petty may retain such portion to compensate 
for the loss or damage. (Exhibit 7-I) 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE RAISED BY 
APPELLANT THAT MARGARET K. NICKLES DID NOT SIGN THE 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT. 
Exhibit 8-I which purports to be the purchase agreement is 
executed by Centurian Corporation as purchaser and guaranteed by 
Richard Nickles only and not by Margaret K. Nickles. This court 
in its decision dated January 29, 1981 at Page 5 of said decision 
stated: 
"Construing both agreements together it was 
reasonable to conclude that Centurian commenced purchase 
of the tank trailer upon signing the "Agreement of 
Sale and Purchase", the incorporated prior "Lease 
Agreement" being merely a means to that end." 
The agreement of purchase, Exhibit 8-I, would then super-
cede and negate any "lease" entered into between the parties. 
Since this court awarded judgment in the decision dated January 
29, 1981 for the total purchase of said tank trailer the lease 
in fact becomes a nullity. 
It is conceded that Margaret K. Nickles guaranteed 
performance of the lease, but she did not guarantee the performance 
of the purchase agreement. 
POINT II 
IF THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS VALID AS AGAINST MARGARET K. 
NICKLES IT WAS TERMINATED AS OF MARCH 25, 1974. 
Exhibit 7-I which is the lease agreement which is 
guaranteed by Margaret K. Nickles provides the following: 
-4-
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"If any rental payment is not paid within ten (10) d.J.•:s 
aft~r the due date ~hereof, this lease shall automatically 
expire. · · · If this lease is terminated by either owner 
or user for any reason or expires as provided in para-
graph 1, hereof, user agrees to pay to owner any and all 
past due payments or other sums then due under the terms 
of t~is leas~ including but not limited to, the cost of 
repairs re9uired to bring the property to good condition 
plus the final lease payment in full and in addition there-
to, to pay 45% of t~e monthly rental multiplied by the 
number of months this lease has yet to run, which sum is 
to compensate owner for the greater costs and depreciation 
occurring during the first part of the lease as compared 
to the last part of the lease." 
There was a payment due on or before March 15, 1974. That 
payment was not made nor any thereafter. As of March 25, 1974 
there was no lease in force. It had been automatically terminated 
by the express language of the lease drafted and prepared by Petty 
Motor Lease, Inc. There would be twenty installments due of $508.00 
which equals $10,160.00. Forty-five percent of $10,160.00 equals 
$4,572.00 plus the last installment of $508.00 equals $5,800.00. 
However, there was a deposit which was utilized expressly for the 
purpose of insuring the performance of the lease of $3,594.63 which 
leaves a net due as of Margaret K. Nickles of less than $2,000.00. 
However, the foregoing analysis really has no bearing to the 
actual damages sustained since the trailer was stolen and no damages 
were in fact incurred beyond Petty's own risk (as to a lessee) the 
case of Brown vs. Rennels, 539 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1975) states: 
... [L]iquidated damages are not recoverable in 
addition to actual damages." (citations omitted) 
There are no actual damages in this instance because this court has 
heretofore as of January 29, 1981 impressed a judgment as against 
Centurian and Richard Nickles for the full value of said tank traileJ 
under the terms of the purchase agreement. Therefore Petty is 
-5-
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estopped to assert any liquidated damages as against Margaret K. 
Nickles. 
POINT III 
THAT MARGARET K. NICKLES IS A LESSEE ONLY AND THEREFORE 
ABSENT NEGLIGENCE ON MARGARET K. NICKLES' PART CANNOT BE 
HELD FOR THE RISK OF LOSS OF THE TANK TRAILER. 
The uncontroverted evidence discloses that Petty had actual 
knowledge of the sub-lease agreement (and/or sale) to Cripps. At 
page 74 of the record there appears an assignment, wherein Petty 
acknowledges the Centurian-Cripps Agreement and gives Centurian 
all right and interest to pursue its cause of action. Centurian 
did not have possession of, nor control of, the trailer at the time 
of its loss by theft. Mr. Walter Cripps testified at page 269: 
Q. When was the last time that you saw the trailer? 
A. February of '74. 
Q. And where was it at that time? 
A. Henry Mills' property in Lower Middle Creek. 
Q. Where is that? Where is Lower Middle Creek? 
A. South of Price about four miles. 
Q. Carbon County? 
A. Carbon County. 
Q. Do you know where the trailer is today? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Have you a record -- well, what has happened to the 
trailer? Do you know what has happened to it? 
A. The trailer was stolen, taken off from Henry Mills' 
property without permission. 
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Q. Did you make any report of that to the authorities? 
A. As soon as I found out it was stolen I reported it. 
Q. Calling your attention to Exhibit 4P, were you the person who reported that missing trailer on that particular date? 
A. To the best of my knowledge that is true and correct. 
The trial court found, at page 109 of the record: 
12. That on or about March 15, 1974, the tank trailer 
was stolen. 
13. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that 
Defendants were negligent or failed to take proper care to 
the tank trailer so as to prevent it from being stolen. 
Centurian/Nickles did not even have possession of the 
trailer at the time of the theft, but were seeking to obtain 
possession by way of a Writ of Replevin. The law has long been 
established under circumstances of bailment for hire that in the 
absence of negligence the bailee is not liable for an act of a 
third party intervenor. In 8 Am.Jur.2d Bailments §201 by the 
following language: 
Unless a bailee has violated his contract he will 
not be liable in the absence of negligence, for 
loss of injury in respect to the thing bailed, 
resulting from the inherent nature of the property 
itself or some infirmity thereof, from disaster or 
accidental casualty or from robbery, burglary, or theft. 
This general law has been applied by this court in the case 
of Barlow Upholstry and Furniture Co., v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900 (Utah 
1975). In the case of Stehle Equipment Co. v. Alpha Construction 
& Dev. Co., 247 Md. 210, 230 A.2d 654 (1967) the Maryland court in 
addressing this question stated at page 655: 
In its brief, appellee conceded that there was a 
bailment for hire which imposed upon the bailee an 
obligation to exercise ordinary care and diligence 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in using and safeguarding the bailed property and to 
return it in as good condition, ordinary wear and tear 
excepted, as when it was received. (citations omitted) 
Once appellant proved the delivery, the bailment for hire, 
and the unexplained failure to return the property in its 
condition when received, a prima facie case of negligence 
was made out. However, where the loss was accounted for 
as having been occasioned by a cause which would excuse 
the bailee, the defense was complete unless the bailor 
followed by showing that the bailee, by the exercise of 
ordinary care, might have avoided the injury. (citations 
omitted and emphasis supplied) 
This same view has been held by the Texas court in Tuloma 
Rigging, Inc. v. Barge and Crane Rentals, Etc., 460 S.W.2d 510 
(Texas 1970) wherein it states: 
We think it is the law that if a lessee, without fault, 
is denied useful possession of the leased property, the 
purpose of the lease agreement is so frustrated as to 
discharge lessee of his obligation further to pay rent. 
A mutual benefit bailee is not liable if the subject-
rnatter of the bailment has been injured by some internal 
decay, by accident, or by some other means wholly without 
his fault, and in the absence of some special stipulation, 
as injury to or loss of the property usually falls on the 
bailor. The bailee, however, is required to exercise 
ordinary care to preserve and protect the bailed property 
in the absence of agreements providing otherwise. 
(citations omitted and emphasis supplied) 
To the same effect is the Gray Eagles, Inc. v. Lucchese, 
37 Mich. App. 322, 194 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1972). The act of theft 
was an independant act over which Centurian/Nickles had no control. 
The only possible thrust of negligence would be the choosing of 
Cripps as a sub-lessee. No allegation exists of said negligence, 
nor was any proof offered by any party of any negligence on behalf 
of anyone. It is therefore submitted that: 
A. Petty assumed the risk by the insurance provisions 
of the contract (Exhibit 7-1). 
B. Petty as bailer assumed that risk as a matter of law 
-8-
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absent any negligence on the part of Centurian/Nickles and/or 
Cripps. 
Since the subject matter of the lease itself no longer 
exists, there can be no performance demanded of Centurian/Nickles 
by Petty absent that element of negligence. The lease was paid 
in fully through the time of the theft. Thereafter, no further 
payments were due, since Petty could no longer perform its part 
of the bargain, to wit: no trailer. 
POINT IV 
PETTY MADE AN ELECTION OF REMEDY. 
Once a party has made an affirmative act of election of 
remedies, he is bound. Utah has adopted this view. In the 
cases of Utah Idaho C.R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 
364, 35 P.2d 842; Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C. I. T. 
Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045; and Cook v. Covey-
Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 all adopt and sustain 
the doctrine of election of remedies. Indeed, in Cook the court 
held: 
The true rule seems to be (1) that there 
must be, in fact, two or more coexisting remedies 
upon which the party has the right to elect; (2) 
the remedies thus open to him must be alternative 
and inconsisten; and (3) he must by actually bringing 
an action or by some other decisive act, with 
knowledge of the facts, indicate his choice between 
these inconsisten remedies .... With such elements 
present, an election once deliberately made by the 
institution of a suit, by which the remedy is sought 
to be recovered, is final, and his failure to secure 
satisfaction by means of the remedy which he has 
adopted furnishes no legal reason to permit him to 
resort to the other. 
The rationale of this doctrine is that once a party has 
-9-
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acted in choosing between two or more different and coexisting 
modes of procedure and relief allowed by law that the party is 
thereafter precluded to a resort to the other remedy or relief. 
Election of remedies differs from estoppel in that an 
election, to be effective, need not be acted upon by the other 
party by way of detrimental change of his position, provided the 
election is a decisive one. 
Plaintiff elected to sue for a sale to Centurian and 
R. H. Nickles. Plaintiff therefore elected his remedy and 
cannot now seek an alternative relief as against Margaret K. Nickles 
on the theory of lease, which is inconsistent with a sale. 
The election is absolute, irrevocable, final and conclusive. 
It matters not whether plaintiff actually gets final or even full 
relief, however, in this instance Petty did in fact receive full 
and complete relief. Under §32 Election of Remedies, 25 Am. 
Jur.2d p. 674, 675, it states: 
Where a party . . . makes an election 
between inconsistent remedies, ... his election 
is final, conclusive, and irrevocable, and consti-
tutes an absolute bar to any action, suit, or 
proceeding inconsistent with that asserted by the 
election. It is the first act of election that acts 
as a bar. 
This is supported by the case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial 
Commission, 81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d 239, wherein the court concluded 
that it is the first decisive act of election that is binding. 
Petty's first decisive act was filing the Complaint in 
Intervention whereas he sought a "sale" as opposed to a "lease". 
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CONCLUSION 
It is essential that this court address this issue of the 
liability, if any, of Margaret K. Nickles in light of the decision 
of January 29, 1981. That in order to be consistent with that 
decision there cannot be any liability imposed or impressed upon 
Margaret K. Nickles based upon formal requirements as provided 
under Utah law 70A-2-201, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
nor is there any contractural obligation to be impressed upon 
Margaret K. Nickles for which recovery could be sustained in favor 
of Petty Motor Lease, Inc. Since Petty Motor Lease, Inc. has been 
fully compensated by the decision heretofore entered by this court. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the judgment heretofore 
entered against Margaret K. Nickles be vacated and reversed. 
DATED this the /~ day of February, 1981. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN'._& DUNN 
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